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Abstract
Waiting times are commonly used in the health sector to ration
demand. We show that when money charges (coinsurance rates) are
optimally set and there are no redistributional considerations, it is
never optimal to have a positive waiting time if the marginal cost of
waiting is higher for patients with greater bene￿ts from health care.
Although waiting time provides an additional instrument to control
demand it does not mitigate the con￿ ict between e¢ cient risk bearing
and e¢ cient consumption of health care.
Keywords: Waiting times; Rationing; Optimal pricing; Insurance
JEL classi￿cation codes: H21, H42, I11, I18
1 Introduction
Rationing of health care by waiting is common in many OECD countries.
It is an apparently ine¢ cient method of allocating resources: it imposes a
cost on the consumer in the form of delayed health improvement or reduced
productive capacity. But unlike rationing by price the cost to the consumer
is not o⁄set by any gain for the producer, or indeed anyone else. The costs
imposed on patients are thus a deadweight loss (Barzel, 1974).
The usual welfare justi￿cation for rationing by waiting is that policy
makers have distributional motives but face constraints on their tax and
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1price instruments. Bucovetsky (1984) showed that providing rationed access
to a good priced below cost pushes rich individuals into the private sector,
thereby reducing the cost of ￿nancing the subsidised good consumed by the
poor. Besley and Coate (1991) make a similar argument in which a good
is produced at lower quality in the public sector than in the private sector.
Hoel and Saether (2003) show that if distributional objectives are su¢ ciently
strong, rationing by waiting can increase welfare even if governments can use
non-linear tax schedules.
The welfare gains from rationing by waiting seem to be rather small
(Marchand and Schroyan, 2004). In this paper we consider whether there is
an additional welfare argument for rationing by waiting. The welfare justi￿-
cations so far do not take full account of a salient feature of health care: the
uncertainty of ill health and the role of insurance. Ideal insurance would have
e¢ cient risk bearing (equal marginal utility of income across health states)
and e¢ cient consumption of care (marginal value of care equal to its mar-
ginal cost). But insurers, whether public or private sector, can observe only
expenditure, not the health state. Consequently health insurance, apart from
a limited amount of ￿dread disease￿cover, is insurance against expenditure,
not health state, leading to ex-post moral hazard which insurers can attempt
to mitigate by providing partial reimbursement of health care expenditures.
This suggests that it may be possible to increase welfare by using an addi-
tional instrument - waiting time - to control utilisation, thereby improving
the trade-o⁄ between e¢ cient risk bearing and e¢ cient use.
To focus on the potential role of waiting time as a means of mitigating
ex post moral hazard we use a welfare model whose speci￿cation rules out
previous rationales for rationing by waiting: individuals have identical pref-
erences, income, and health risks and there is no private sector provision of
health care. We show that in these circumstances a positive waiting time may
increase welfare and we discuss the factors in￿ uencing the optimal combina-
tion of price and waiting. However, we also show that a necessary condition
for an optimal positive waiting time is that the marginal cost of waiting is
smaller for patients with higher bene￿t from treatment. This seems implau-
sible. It implies that a patient whose treatment will produce a 1 QALY gain
in health would be willing to pay more for a reduction in the waiting time
from six months to one month than an otherwise identical patient with a
QALY gain of 10. We conclude that a positive waiting time is unlikely to
improve the trade-o⁄ between e¢ cient risk bearing and e¢ cient utilisation
of health care.
Although made in the context of public-sector health-care system, the
arguments carry over to the design of optimal insurance contracts by private
insurers and HMOs. Insurers cannot o⁄er a contract preferred by insureds
2under which insureds are required to use particular providers with positive
waiting times.
2 Model speci￿cation
The most salient form of rationing by waiting time is rationing by waiting
list for elective care.1 Individuals bear a cost in getting on the waiting list
for treatment. In systems with gatekeeping general practitioners, patients
￿rst have to consult their general practitioner to get a referral and then
incur further costs in attending hospital outpatient department to be seen
by a specialist who will then place them on a waiting list. The longer the
time potential patients know they will have to wait on the list, the less the
discounted value of the treatment and the less likely are they to be willing
to incur the initial costs of joining the list (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984).
We assume individuals are ex ante identical. Their number is normalised
to 1. There is a single treatment provided only in the public sector at a
constant unit cost of c. Health care is ￿nanced by a lump-sum tax T and
a charge p for treatment. Equivalently there is compulsory public health
insurance with a premium of T and a coinsurance rate of p=c.
Ex post individuals are either ill (probability ￿) or well. If ill they either
join the waiting list and are treated or decide not to join the list and are not
treated. Individual illness probabilities are independent.
If ill and treated utility is v1(y1(w;h) ￿ T ￿ p;h;w) where y1 is income,
w is the waiting time and h is the health gain from immediate treatment.
h 2 (hmin;hmax) has distribution function F(h). We assume that y1w ￿ 0
and y1h ￿ 0 to allow for the possibilities that waiting for treatment may
reduce income and that income increases with health. Utility is increasing in
income and health bene￿t and non-increasing in waiting time: v1w ￿ 0. The
speci￿cation allows waiting time to impose a cost on the patient because it
reduces income, or because it reduces health gain when actually treated or
because it has a direct utility cost.
Utility if well is v0(y0 ￿ T) and if ill and untreated is v2(y2 ￿ T) where
y0;y2 are exogenous. We assume ill health does not increase income: y0 ￿
y1(0;hmax) ￿ y2.2
1In some systems there is rationing by waiting in line (queues) where the opportunity
cost to individuals arises from the more valuable work or leisure uses of the time spent
waiting. Such rationing can be used for minor ailments in hospital accident and emergency
rooms and for general practitioner consultations.
2We could allow for endogenous labour supply to a⁄ect income ys (s = 0;1;2) but
this merely complicates the exposition and makes no di⁄erence to the results since the
3Individuals are averse to consumption or income risk (vsyy < 0, s =
0;1;2). The speci￿cation permits marginal utility of income to depend on
whether the individual is ill and on the health gain and the waiting time.
When ill the utility gain from joining the waiting list, paying p for treat-
ment and waiting w is3
￿(T;p;w;h) = v1(y1(w;h) ￿ T ￿ p;h;w) ￿ v2(y2 ￿ T) (1)
Since dv1=dh = v1yy1h + v1h > 0 there exists a threshold health gain
^ h = ^ h(T;p;w) such that individuals join the list and are treated if and only
if h ￿ ^ h(T;p;w). We rule out uninteresting cases where either everyone is
treated (^ h = hmin) or no one is (^ h = hmax) and so ^ h(T;p;w;h) is de￿ned by
￿(T;p;w;h) = 0. Demand per ill individual is
D(T;p;w) = 1 ￿ F(^ h(T;p;w)) (2)
with
DT = ￿f(^ h)^ hT = ￿f(^ h)[^ v1y ￿ v2y][d^ v1=dh]
￿1 (3)
Dp = ￿f(^ h)^ hp = ￿f(^ h)^ v1y [d^ v1=dh]
￿1 < 0 (4)
Dw = ￿f(^ h)^ hw = ￿f(^ h)[^ v1yy1w + ^ v1w][d^ v1=dh]
￿1 < 0 (5)
where the hat on ^ v1y; ^ v1w;d^ v1=dh indicates that the derivatives are evaluated
at ^ h.
The policy problem is to choose the charge p, the wait w, and the lump-
sum tax or premium T to maximise
(1 ￿ ￿)v0(y0 ￿ T)
+ ￿
(Z ^ h
v2 (y2 ￿ T)dF +
Z
^ h
v1(y1(w;b) ￿ T ￿ p;h;w)dF
)
(6)
subject to the budget constraint
T + ￿(p ￿ c)D(w;p;T) ￿ 0 (7)
marginal e⁄ects of the insurance policy on labour supply are irrelevant by virtue of the
envelope theorem. We could interpret vs as an indirect utility functions in which we have
suppressed the wage rate.
3We ignore the complications arising from the possibility that patients and their gen-
eral practitioners are uncertain about the diagnosis and hence whether a specialist will
recommend joining the waiting list and the fact there may be a wait to see the specialist.
These make no essential di⁄erence to the properties of the rationing by waiting mechanism
(Gravelle, Dusheiko and Sutton, 2002).
4We do not restrict the sign of p and T: in addition to the conventional
insurance contract (p 2 (0;c); T > 0) it is feasible to pay sick individuals
to be treated (p < 0;T > 0) or to make a pro￿t on the sale of health care
(p > c) which can be paid to all individuals as a lump sum dividend (T < 0).
Crucially, it is not possible to make payments contingent on the states
of the world (being well, being ill) of any individual. If it was the optimal
policy would be to set the charge equal to marginal cost and to compensate
sick individuals with a payment, whether or not they consume care, thereby
decoupling insurance (the equalisation of marginal utilities across states of
the world) from incentives (the e¢ cient consumption of health care). By
varying the charge and the premium it is only feasible to make transfers of
income between the event ￿not ill, or ill and not treated￿and the event ￿ill
and treated￿ .
We assume that preferences, income and medical technologies, and the
distribution of health gain are such that the welfare function is concave in
the instruments, and the feasible set convex.
3 Optimal insurance
De￿ne L and ￿ respectively as the Lagrangian function and multiplier. The
necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst order conditions are
LT = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)v0y ￿ ￿ [(1 ￿ D)v2y + D￿ v1y] + ￿[1 + (p ￿ c)￿DT] = 0 (8)




(v1yy1w + v1w)dF+￿[(p ￿ c)￿Dw] ￿ 0; w ￿ 0; Lww = 0 (10)
L￿ = T + ￿(p ￿ c)D(w;p;T) ￿ 0; ￿ ￿ 0; L￿￿ = 0 (11)
where ￿ v1y =
R
^ h v1ydF=D = ￿ v1y(T;p;w) is expected utility if ill and treated.
The budget constraint will bind and ￿ > 0 since the marginal utility of
income is positive (vsy > 0;s = 0;1;2).
We did not constrain the optimal policy to have T > 0;p < c. Suppose
that there is no insurance (p = c, T = 0). Then, using (9),
LT = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v0y ￿ ￿ [Fv2y + (1 ￿ F)￿ v1y]
= ￿ v1y[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿F] ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)v0y + ￿Fv2y] (12)
Hence a su¢ cient condition for the optimal policy to be a conventional in-
surance policy (T > 0;p < c) is that
￿ v1y(0;c;w) >









5so that when there is no insurance the expected marginal utility of income in
the event ￿ill and treated￿is greater than average expected marginal utility
of income from the event ￿not ill, or ill and not treated￿ . We will assume
that the condition (13) is satis￿ed.
One set of assumptions that ensures (13) is v0 = v (y1), v1 = v (y1 ￿ T ￿ p)+
u(h;w), and v2 = v(y2), with y1 not a⁄ected by h or w and y1 ￿ minfy0;y2g.
Since the optimal contract has T > 0; p < c the marginal value of relaxing
the budget constraint is
￿ =
Evsy
1 + ￿(p ￿ c)DT
< ￿ v1y (14)
i.e. the expected marginal utility of income (Evsy) adjusted for the feedback
e⁄ect of additional income on the budget via demand. From (9) this is less
than the expected marginal utility of income for treated patients.
We can use the ￿rst order conditions to describe the optimal contract









(b) If a positive wait for treatment is optimal then it satis￿es










(￿ ￿ ￿ v1y)
￿
(17)
where "p;"w are the demand elasticities with respect to money price and wait-
ing time and ￿ =
R
^ h (v1yy1w + uw)dF=D is the per patient expected marginal
disutility from waiting.
The condition for the optimal charge (15) appears similar to the Boiteux-
Ramsey pricing rule (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) but di⁄ers in crucial re-
spects (Besley, 1988). The Boiteux-Ramsey rule arises when it is not possible
to use non-distorting lump sum taxes to ￿nance public expenditure. As a
consequence the shadow value of the public sector budget constraint (￿) ex-
ceeds the marginal utility of income of consumers. Hence p > c and price
is higher the less elastic is demand. Here there are lump-sum taxes and
all individuals have the same income, but the shadow value of the budget
6constraint is less than the marginal utility of income of treated individuals
because moral hazard rules out full insurance which equalises the marginal
utilities of individuals. The optimal price is less than marginal cost (p < c)
and is lower the less elastic is demand.
If individuals were risk neutral with respect to income, the assumptions
of feasible lump-sum taxes and identical individuals, would imply that the
optimal price was equal to marginal cost and hence that the optimal wait
was zero (see (10)). Thus risk aversion leads to an insurance scheme which
subsidises care and may also ration care by waiting.
Raising the price and reducing the waiting time so as to leave supply
unchanged transfers income from ill treated patients to the ill and not treated
and to the well. If income has the same marginal value for all individuals
the transfer would have no welfare consequence, since the reduction in the
waiting time reduces a deadweight loss and welfare is increased. But this
argument does not work because imperfect information prevents insurance
equalising ex post marginal utilities of income. The marginal utility of income
of patients paying a charge is greater than the marginal utility of the well
and the ill but untreated. Hence the transfer of charge revenue from ill and
treated patients to the well and to the ill but untreated has a net social
cost. If this is greater than the deadweight loss imposed by waiting then it
is optimal to have positive waiting times for care.
As (17) indicates, the wait will be higher relative to the charge the greater
the di⁄erence between the marginal utility of income of patients (￿ v1y) and
the marginal utility of income of taxpayers as a whole (￿) because the larger
is ￿ v1y ￿ ￿ the greater the utility cost of controlling demand by raising price.
Waiting time will be higher relative to price the more elastic is demand with
respect to waiting time and the less the elastic is demand with respect to
price.
4 When is the optimal waiting time zero?








The ￿rst term is negative: increases in w make the treated patient worse o⁄
directly (v1w) and via reduced income (v1yy1w). The second term is positive:
increasing the waiting time permits a reduction in the price at the rate Dw=Dp
with demand, and hence the cost of health care which must be covered by the
premium, is unchanged. The net ￿nancial e⁄ect is then just the reduction in
7the price. A £1 reduction in the price increases expected utility by (￿D￿ v1y)
but tightens the budget constraint since charge revenue has fallen by ￿D.
The reduction in charge revenue reduces expected utility at the rate ￿D￿ so
that the transfer of income across individuals increases expected utility since
￿ v1y > ￿.
This explains how a positive wait might increase welfare but it does not
establish whether it does. Substituting in (18) for Dp and Dw from (4) and




(v1yy1w + v1w)dF + ￿D(￿ ￿ ￿ v1y)
(^ v1y^ y1w + ^ v1w)
^ v1y
= ￿￿D


















where, recall, the hats indicate that the derivatives are evaluated at the




v1w(y1(w;h) ￿ p ￿ T;h;w)
v1y(y1(w;h) ￿ p ￿ T;h;w)
￿
(20)
is the marginal cost of waiting for a patient with a health gain of h. The ￿rst
part of the marginal cost is the loss of income from a longer wait. The second
part is the monetary value of the utility loss arising either because the longer
wait reduces the ￿nal achieved health or because waiting is disliked per se.
Thus
Proposition 2 The optimal wait is zero if the marginal cost of waiting is











We suggest that (21) is likely to be satis￿ed in most cases. Consider
what would properties of the income function or preferences for it not to
hold: either y1wh > 0 or d(v1w=v1y)=dh > 0. y1wh = y1hw > 0 means that
the income gain from a treatment with a wait of one month is less than the
income gain from a treatment with the same health e⁄ect with a wait of six
months. There may be cases in which treatment at very short notice would
disrupt income generating activity more than if the patient had longer to
arrange her a⁄airs but in most instances longer waits will not increase the
8income gain from treatment. The implausibility of d(v1w=v1y)=dh > 0 can
be seen if we consider a simple case in which utility is additive separable:
v1 = v(y1 ￿ T ￿ p) + u(h;w). d(v1w=v1y)=dh > 0 is then equivalent to
uhw = uwh > 0: the utility gain from treatment increases the longer one waits
or the marginal cost of waiting is higher for patients with greater bene￿ts
from health care.
5 Conclusion
Waiting times are used in many OECD countries to ration demand in health
care (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005). Besley and Coate (1991), Bucovetsky (1984),
Hoel and Saether (2003), and Marchand and Schroyan (2005) have provided
a justi￿cation for a positive waiting time based on the desire to redistribute
in the presence of distorting taxes. These arguments do not take account of
the facts that individual expenditure on health care is uncertain and that
because of information asymmetries neither public nor private insurers can
provide insurance with both e¢ cient risk bearing and e¢ cient consumption.
We have investigated whether positive waits can be justi￿ed as an additional
means of controlling demand and thereby improving the trade-o⁄ between
e¢ cient risk bearing and e¢ cient consumption of care.
We ￿nd that the plausible assumption that patient willingness to pay for a
reduction in waiting time is non decreasing in the health gain from treatment,
implies that in the absence of distributional considerations and if the price
of care (or coinsurance rate) is set optimally, there is no welfare gain from
having a positive waiting time. Marchand and Schroyan (2005) have shown
that even when policy makers do wish to distribute the welfare gains from
rationing by waiting, these are rather small. Coupled with our ￿nding, this
suggests that other normative rationales for the long waits observed in many
countries are required, perhaps based on extra-welfarist objectives (Culyer,
1989).
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